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Abstract—The public key infrastructure (PKI) based 
authentication protocol provides the basic security services for 
vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). However, trust and 
privacy are still open issues due to the unique characteristics of 
vehicles. It is crucial for VANETs to prevent internal vehicles 
from broadcasting forged messages while simultaneously 
protecting the privacy of each vehicle against tracking attacks. In 
this paper, we propose a blockchain-based anonymous reputation 
system (BARS) to break the linkability between real identities 
and public keys to preserve privacy. The certificate and 
revocation transparency is implemented efficiently using two 
blockchains. We design a trust model to improve the 
trustworthiness of messages relying on the reputation of the 
sender based on both direct historical interactions and indirect 
opinions about the sender. Experiments are conducted to 
evaluate BARS in terms of security and performance and the 
results show that BARS is able to establish distributed trust 
management, while protecting the privacy of vehicles. 
Keywords—vehicular ad-hoc networks, blockchain, trust 
management, reputation system, privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that the number of registered vehicles will 
reach 2 billion within the next 10 to 20 years [1]. Recently, 
vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have been suggested as 
the foundation of intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) to 
improve the transportation efficiency and ensure the safety of 
both vehicles and pedestrians. Two types of communications, 
namely vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicles-to-infrastructure 
(V2I) communication [2] are established in VANETs to 
promote cooperation among vehicles and to share valuable 
driving information. Through dedicated short range 
communication (DSRC) radio, vehicles exchange messages 
with nearby vehicles in V2V and communicate directly with 
roadside units (RSUs) in V2I [2]. 
However, the unique characteristics of VANETs such as 
high mobility and volatility make it vulnerable to various kinds 
of attacks. Security, privacy, and trust should be taken into 
account from the beginning stages of designing VANETs. 
Although major security services have been well-studied in 
other fields that can provide secure communication channels 
against external attackers, trust management and privacy 
protection for vehicles are still open issues for VANETs. 
Specifically, it is fairly difficult to deal with misbehaviors and 
distribution of forged messages from authenticated vehicles. 
These forged messages could not only decrease the 
transportation efficiency but also in the worst cases, cause 
accidental events that can threaten human life [3]. In addition, 
internal attackers can easily track other vehicles or profile the 
drivers’ actions by analyzing all the broadcasted messages in 
VANETs. 
In order to provide a trust communication environment, 
trust management evaluates the trustworthiness of messages 
based on both direct historical interactions and indirect 
opinions about the senders [4]. An effective trust model should 
have the following properties: 
Efficiency. It should be efficient in determining the 
trustworthiness of a warning message in both congested and 
sparse situations.  
Privacy. It should not reveal any sensitive information such 
as the real identity of the senders. 
Robustness. It should be resistant against attacks aiming at 
deceiving the trustworthiness evaluation or disabling the trust 
model. 
The blockchain is the underlying technology of the Bitcoin 
protocol that emerged in 2008 [5]. It is a distributed public 
ledger encrypted using Merkel tree and hash function and has a 
consensus mechanism based on a proof of work (PoW) 
algorithm. These significant features of blockchain make it  
potential for constructing the desirable trust model in VANETs. 
All the broadcasted messages and actions of vehicles will be 
written into the immutable and unforgeable record, which can 
be verified and audited by every entity in the network. 
However, the transparency of blockchain means privacy is not 
considered naturally. By reviewing the ledger, the actions 
made with any public key is traceable to a real identity. 
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based anonymous 
reputation system (BARS) to establish distributed trust 
management while simultaneously protecting the privacy of 
vehicles. The main contributions of BARS are twofold: 
First, we exploit the features of blockchain to extend 
conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) with an efficient 
privacy-preserving authentication mechanism. The linkability 
between the public key and the real identity of a vehicle is 
eliminated when a certificate authority (CA) operates the 
certificate issuance and revocation. All the actions of CA are 
recorded in blockchain transparently without revealing 
sensitive information about vehicles so that the public key can 
be used as an authenticated pseudonym. The law enforcement 
authority (LEA) is responsible for managing BARS and 
recording the pairs of public key and real identity in case of 
disputes. 
Second, we design the reputation management algorithm to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of each vehicle according to the 
authenticity of broadcasted messages as well as opinions from 
other vehicles. All the messages are recorded in blockchain as 
persistent evidence for LEA to evaluate the reputation score for 
each vehicle. The reputation score provides an incentive for 
internal vehicles to prevent misbehaviors and mitigate the 
distribution of forged messages. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Sections II surveys the existing trust models for VANETs. 
Section III introduces the background knowledge, including 
the rationale of blockchain, certificate transparency, the 
components of BARS, and the necessary assumptions. Section 
IV proposes the anonymous authentication to protect the 
privacy of vehicles. The reputation evaluation algorithm is 
presented in Section V. Finally, we conduct simulations in 
Section VI to evaluate BARS in terms of security and 
performance and give the conclusion. 
II. TRUST MODELS IN VANETS 
 As illustrated in Fig. 1, state-of-the-art trust models can be 
classified into three categories: (1) entity-centric trust models, 
(2) data-centric trust models, and (3) combined trust models. 
None of them meets all the requirements of a desirable trust 
model for VANETs. 
A. Entity-centric Trust Models 
Entity-centric trust models focus on evaluating the 
trustworthiness of vehicles. The main methods to achieve this 
efficiently and accurately are to establish a reputation system 
or to make a decision according to the opinions of neighbors. 
There are several typical works. Minhas et al. [6] develops a 
multifaceted trust modeling approach to detect the entities that 
are generating malicious data. This method incorporates role-, 
experience-, priority-, and majority-based trust to make a real-
time decision. Mármol at al. [7] proposes a trust and reputation 
infrastructure-based proposal (TRIP) for VANETs to quickly 
and accurately distinguish malicious or selfish nodes with the 
help of RSUs. Haddadou et al. [8] propose a distributed trust 
model (DTM2) to allocate credits to nodes and securely 
manage these credits. Due to the high mobility of vehicles, it is 
difficult to collect enough information to calculate the 
reputation score of a specific node. Moreover, another serious 
issue that has not been resolved is how to ensure the security of 
the reputation system itself. 
B. Data-centric Trust Models 
Data-centric trust models focus on the trustworthiness of 
received data. In order to verify the trustworthiness of the 
received data accurately, the models need cooperative 
information from various sources such as neighbor vehicles or 
RSUs. Gurung et al. [9] propose a trust model to directly 
evaluate the trustworthiness of a message based on various 
factors such as content similarity, content conflict, and route 
similarity. Huang et al. [10] develop a voting system with 
different voting weights according to its distance from the 
event. Rawat et al. [11] propose a deterministic approach to 
measure the trust level of the received message by using 
received signal strength (RSS) for distance calculations as well 
as the vehicle’s geolocation (position coordinate). Hussain et al. 
[12] suggest email-based social trust and social networks-based 
trust to establish and manage data level trust. The major 
drawbacks of data-centric trust models are latency and data 
sparsity. Respectively, large numbers of data from various 
sources may contain redundant information, which will 
increase latency or overwhelm the significant information. On 
the contrary, data sparsity is prevalent in VANETs. It is 
unrealistic for data-centric trust models model to perform well 
without enough information. 
C. Combined Trust Models 
Both entity and data are the main objects in this category. 
Combined trust models not only evaluate the trust level of 
vehicles but also calculate the trustworthiness of data [13]. 
Thus, these models inherit the benefits and drawbacks of 
entity-centric and data-centric trust models. The attack-
resistant trust management scheme (ART) proposed by Li et al. 
[14] cope with malicious attacks in VANETs. Trustworthiness 
of data is evaluated based on the received data from multiple 
vehicles. Trustworthiness of a node is determined based on 
functional trust and recommendation trust, which respectively 
indicate whether a node can fulfill its functionality and what 
the trust level of the recommendations from it is. The proposed 
scheme does not take into account data sparsity, which is 
pervasive in VANETs. 
III. BACKGROUND OF BARS 
Before elaborating how BARS works, we will first 
introduce the way blockchain works and how it guarantees 
security. Then we will point out the problems of conventional 
PKI and explain the concept of certificate transparency. Finally, 
we will introduce the major components of BARS with their 
functions and give some necessary assumptions. 
 
Fig. 1. Trust models proposed in recent years. 
A. Blockchain 
The blockchain is a computational paradigm which 
emerged with the Bitcoin protocol in 2008 [5]. It is a 
distributed ledger containing all transactions ever executed 
within the network. The ledger is enforced with cryptography 
and carried out collectively in a peer-to-peer network. As a 
secure and decentralized computational infrastructure, it is 
widely acknowledged as a disruptive solution for the problems 
of centralization, privacy and security when storing, tracking, 
monitoring, managing and sharing data [15]. 
B. Certificate Transparency 
Certificate transparency [16] is invented by Google and 
aims to prevent transport layer security (TLS) certificate 
authorities from issuing public key certificates for a domain 
without it being visible to the owner of the domain. This 
technology is being built into Google Chrome aiming at 
website certificates. 
The core idea of certificate transparency is that a public 
append-only log is maintained to show all the certificates that 
have been issued. Anyone can append a certificate to the log. 
Auditors can obtain two types of proofs: (a) a proof that the log 
contains a given certificate and (b) a proof that a snapshot of 
the log is an extension of another snapshot (i.e., only appends 
have taken place between the two snapshot). 
C. Components of BARS 
Certificate Authority (CA). CA issues and revokes 
certificates only if it gets a warrant from LEA. All the actions 
of CA will be recorded transparently in the blockchain and can 
be verified by every entity in the VANETs 
Law Enforcement Authority (LEA). The functions of 
LEA include registration, monitoring vehicles, and evaluating 
the reputation scores of each vehicle. LEA authorizes CA for 
certificates issuance and revocation. LEA also keeps the 
database that contains correlation between vehicles’ public 
keys and the real identities with high-level security.  
Certificate. The certificate contains the expiration date, the 
public key, and the reputation score but no real identity so that 
the privacy of the vehicle is protected.  
Blockchain for certificates (CerBC). CerBC acts as the 
public ledger for all the issued certificates. It provides efficient 
proof of presence for received certificates.  
Blockchain for revoked public keys (RevBC). RevBC 
acts as the public ledger for all revoked public keys. It provides 
efficient proof of absence for the sender’s public key.  
Blockchain for messages (MesBC). All the broadcasted 
messages will be recorded in MesBC as persistent evidence in 
case of disputes. 
Roadside Unit (RSU). The global consensus is based on 
the proof of work (PoW) provided by RSUs. As long as more 
than half of the RSUs are not compromised, the security of 
BARS can be guaranteed. 
Vehicle. On one hand, vehicles can monitor CA and LEA 
by verifying that all the messages are recorded in blockchains. 
On the other hand, vehicles can monitor each other to prevent 
misbehaviors and forged messages. 
D. Assumptions 
First, the asymmetric cryptography in PKI is able to 
provide a secure communication channel between entities as 
long as the secret key is not stolen. 
Second, law enforcement authority (LEA) has enough 
security levels to keep the dataset containing the correlation 
between vehicles’ public keys and the real identities safe. 
Third, we assume that it is beyond the adversaries’ 
capability to compromise more than half of the RSUs, which is 
the prerequisite to ensure the blockchain itself is secure. 
IV. ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION 
Anonymous authentication is fundamental to trust 
communication and privacy protection. In BARS, CA and LEA 
are responsible for three major functions: system initialization, 
certificate update, and public key revocation. We will first 
respectively present the three functions and then explain the 
process of privacy-preserving authentication. 
A. System Initialization 
Initially, each entity generates a pair of private and public 
keys. When vehicle A enters the network, it uses the secure 
channel to submit LEA its initial public key and materials to 
prove its legal identity. LEA will send a signed warrant to CA 
if the materials are valid. Next, CA will issue an initial 
certificate to vehicle A. 
Note that the submitted material contains vehicle A’s 
private information. Only LEA preserves them in the database 
with high-security level, which will be used for tracking the 
vehicle’s real identity in case of disputes. 
B. Certificate Update 
Vehicle A will send a request to LEA for a certificate 
update in the following situations: First, before the current 
certificate expires. Second, if the security of its private key is 
threatened. Third, if it requests to replace its public key for 
privacy consideration. The public key, reputation score, and 
expiration date are updated in a new certificate. Fig. 2 
illustrates the steps to update certificate anonymously. 
Step 1. Vehicle A generates a new pair of public key and 
private key {PUnA, PRnA}. 
 
Fig. 2. Certificate update process. 
Step 2. Vehicle A sends LEA certificate update request 
encrypted with LEA’s public key PULEA. The request includes 
vehicle A’s current public key PUn-1A, updated public key PUnA, 
proofs of real identity, and the signature SigA using A’s current 
private key PRn-1A. 
Step 3. If vehicle A’s request is verified, LEA will send CA 
a signed warrant. For the purpose of privacy protection, the 
linkability between A’s current and updated public key is 
unknown by CA. 
Step 4. CA will verify the signature in the warrant. Then, 
an updated certificate containing the updated public key PUnA, 
A’s reputation score RptA, and the expiration time TA will be 
issued to vehicle A publicly and recorded into CerBC.  
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C. Public Key Revocation 
 Vehicle A’s public key should be revoked before its 
expiration date when vehicle A requests to replace its public 
key or A’s misbehavior is discovered by LEA. In order to 
provide revocation transparency, LEA sends signed revocation 
instructions to CA that contain the revoked public key PUrev 
and the revocation time Trev. Then CA broadcasts the 
revocation messages that contains the revoked public key, the 
timestamp, and signatures of CA and LEA: 
, , , , ,CA CA LEA LEA rev revRev PU Sig PU Sig PU T
 
The RSUs will verify all the revocation messages in a 
predefined interval, delete the expired public key, and 
lexicographically insert revoked public keys into RevBC. 
RevBC has a lexicographical Merkle tree [17] called LexTree 
that can provide efficient proof of absence.  
D. Authentication Process 
Vehicle A’s certificate CA is used for authentication. When 
vehicle B receives CA, it first checks whether the certificate is 
expired. If not, B will look up the CerBC and RevBC to make 
sure CA is present in CerBC but PUA is absent in RevBC, 
which means PUA is issued and not revoked by CA. Then we 
will give the details of proof of presence and proof of absence. 
The secure analysis will be presented in Section VI. 
1) Proof of Presence: Fig. 3 illustrates how to prove C4 is 
present in CerBC. A tuple (dir, hash) is enough for the proof 
of presence for C4, in which dir = {left, left, right} and hash = 
{h3, h12, h56}. The receiver can get the root hash value using 
the tuple. If this root hash value is equal to the root recorded in 
CerBC, it means C4 and the associated public key is valid. 
2) Proof of Absence: It is unreasonable to force a vehicle 
to demonstrate that its public key is revoked. Thus, a proof of 
absence is necessary for a vehicle to convince others its public 
key is valid. As shown in Fig. 4, all the revoked public keys 
(not expired) are recorded in the data structure based on 
lexicographical Merkle tree. Vehicle A should prove that two 
adjacent public keys (PU7, PU8) exist in the left-right traversal 
of the tree meanwhile PU7 ≤ PUB ≤ PU8 lexicographically. 
A tuple (PU, hash) is used for proof of absence, in which PU = 
{PU7, PU8, PU10, PU6} and hash = {h9, h12, h4}. Similarly, if 
the hash value calculated using the tuple is same as h6 that is 
recorded in RevBC, it means that A’s public key is absent in 
RevBC. 
V. REPUTATION MANAGEMENT 
Blockchain-based anonymous reputation system (BARS) 
relies on the reputation score of a vehicle to determine the trust 
level of broadcasted messages. In this section, we will 
elaborate how BARS can provide a trust communication 
environment while protecting the privacy of vehicles. 
A. Different Types of Messages 
There are three types of messages: beacon messages, alert 
messages, and disclosure messages. Periodically, vehicles 
broadcast beacon messages containing driving status for traffic 
management. Alert messages will be broadcasted when an 
emergency happens, including hard braking or losing control. 
If any vehicle disputes the authenticity of the received message 
or witnesses misbehaviors, they can send disclosure messages 
to LEA. Next, LEA will make a judgment that affects the 
reputation scores of related vehicles. According to the 
criticality of the emergency, alert messages have three levels. 
Level 1. When vehicle A loses control, it will broadcast 
level 1 alert message to avoid collision automatically.  
Level 2. Level 2 alert message is used for forewarning 
nearby vehicles before the sender changes its driving status, 
including braking, lane changing, etc.  
Level 3. In case of poor road conditions such as obstruction 
or road damage, passing vehicles will broadcast level 3 alert 
messages to alert vehicles behind to keep caution. 
B. Reputation Evaluation Algorithm 
The reputation evaluation algorithm consists of a reward 
mechanism and a punishment mechanism. There are two kinds 
of actions that will be rewarded. First, vehicle A broadcasts 
alter messages honestly and actively. Second, vehicle A sends 
 
Fig. 3. Proof of presence. 
 
Fig. 4. Proof of absence [17]. 
disclosure messages to LEA when A witnesses misbehaviors or 
receives forged messages. On the contrary, there are also two 
kinds of actions which will be punished. First, vehicle A is 
disclosed for misbehaviors or broadcasting forged messages. 
Second, vehicle A abuses disclosure messages to slander other 
vehicles. 
There are several factors affecting the evaluation of 
reputation scores as follows: 
L: The level of alert messages, L = 1, 2, 3. 
Dr: The relative density of vehicles, Dr = D/Daver. In this 
paper, Daver is set to 20 vehicles per Km.  
S: The sequence of the senders, S = 0, 1, … , n. S of the first 
vehicle to broadcast an alert message will be set to 0.   
In addition, we set reward coefficient α and penalty 
coefficient β to implement reward mechanism and penalty 
mechanism: 
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As illustrated in Algorithm 1, if no receiver disputes the 
authenticity of an alert message, the reputation score will 
increase based on reward mechanism. On the contrary, if any 
receivers send disclosure messages to dispute the authenticity 
of the alert message, LEA will collect evidence to make a 
judgment. The vehicles who broadcast forged alert messages 
will be punished heavily, while also publishing the vehicles 
who abuse disclosure messages. 
 
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Security Analysis 
1) Security of Certificates: The nature of blockchain 
satisfies the security requirement of certificates. RSUs verify 
the signatures of CA and LEA in the certificate issuance or 
revocation messages, and record them into CerBC and RevBC 
respectively. The global consensus is provided by the PoW of 
RSUs to guarantee that each vehicle has an identical public 
ledger that consists of authenticated certificates and revoked 
public keys.  
2) Security of Broadcasted Messages: Proof of presence in 
CerBC and proof of absence in RevBC ensure the 
authentication of the public key of vehicle A. Then, vehicle A 
will use its private key PRA to generate a signature for each 
broadcasted message and receivers can use A’s public key 
PUA to verify the signature. RSUs and vehicles cooperatively 
recorded all the broadcasted messages into the chronological 
MesBC, which is the persistent evidence when a dispute 
happens. 
3) Privacy of Vehicles: Vehicle A uses public key as the 
pseudonym to break the linkability between the public key and 
the real identity. For the trade-off between security and 
privacy, the database of identity-public key pairs is stored with 
high-security level in LEA. This means only LEA knows the 
real identity of any public key so that LEA is able to track the 
malicious vehicle when it performs misbehaviors or 
broadcasts forged messages.  
B. Validity of Reputation Evaluation Algorithm 
We consider three vehicles who perform different 
behaviors in 100 hours. As Fig. 5 presents, from T1 to T2 and 
T3 to T4, vehicle A and B actively broadcast authentic 
messages and their reputation scores increase. From T2 to T3, 
vehicle B broadcasts five forged messages and is disclosed by 
A. Thus, A’s reputation score increases whereas B gets 
punished. From T4 to T5, vehicle B abuses five disclosure 
messages to slander other vehicles. As a result, B’s reputation 
score decreases. Vehicle C refuses to participate in BARS. 
The results show that the reputation score effectively reflects 
vehicle’s behavior. 
C. Performance Evaluation 
All the experiments are conducted using 2.5 GHz Intel 
Core i5 and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3. The time consumption to 
compute an SHA-256 is less than t1 = 0.01 ms per 1 KB of 
input. 
1) Storage & Transmission Overhead: A block header 
would be about 80 bytes [5]. Suppose that blocks are 
generated every 10 minutes, the storage overhead for one 
 
Fig. 5. Reputation score of three vehicles. 
blockchain is 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2 MB per year. An 
authentication packet for a public key consists of the 
associated certificate (about 100 bytes), the tuple for proof of 
presence in CerBC, and the tuple for proof of absence in 
RevBC. Suppose there are n issued certificates and m revoked 
public keys, the total storage overhead of an authentication 
packet is S = 100 bytes + 32 bytes * log2n + (32 bytes + 8 
bytes) * log2m. The main source of transmission overhead is 
the authentication packets and beacon messages (about 100 
bytes for each). Suppose that vehicle A receives i 
authentication packets per second from nearby vehicles, in 
which there are j new public keys. A will automatically 
discard the rest of an authentication packet if the public key is 
in the list of authenticated vehicles. Thus, the total 
transmission overhead is Tran = 100 bytes * (i - j) + S bytes * 
j per second. If we set i = 100, j = i * 10%, n = 1 000 000, m = 
n * 10%, the total transmission overhead is about 0.177 M/s. 
The result shows that the storage & transmission overhead of 
anonymous authentication is acceptable. 
2) Computation Overhead: The proof of presence and 
proof of absence are based on SHA-256 and can be done in 
time and space O(logn) (n is the number of elements in the 
Merkle tree). Theoretically, the time consumption to 
authenticate one public key is T = t1 * ( log2n + log2m ). We 
assume that m = n * 10%, i.e. 10% of the public keys are 
revoked. Fig. 6 illustrates the time consumption of anonymous 
authentication in different scales of VANETs. The 
logarithmic-size proofs of presence and absence provide 
efficient authentication in large-scale network. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we address the issues of trust and privacy in 
VANETs. In order to prevent the distribution of forged 
messages from authenticated vehicles while protecting the 
identity privacy of vehicles, a blockchain-based anonymous 
reputation system (BARS) is proposed for anonymous 
authentication and trust communication for VANETs. 
Vehicles use two blockchains (CerBC and RevBC) for 
authentication, which is based on proofs of presence and 
absence. Additionally, public keys act as the pseudonyms for 
anonymous communication and the linkability between the 
real identity and the public key is eliminated to protect 
vehicles’ privacy. On the other hand, all the broadcasted 
messages are recorded in MesBC as persistent evidence to 
evaluate each vehicle’s reputation. A reputation management 
algorithm is designed for trust communication to prevent the 
spread of forged messages and incentivize vehicles to expose 
misbehaviors. Finally, we analyze the security and validity of 
BARS and evaluate the performance. The results show that 
BARS effectively improves the trustworthiness of broadcasted 
messages and protects vehicle privacy with high efficiency. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This work is supported in part of National Science 
Foundation of China (Grant No. 61376026 and No.61176026). 
REFERENCES 
[1] D. Jia, K. Lu, J. Wang, X. Zhang, and X. Shen, “A survey on platoon-
based vehicular cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Communications Surveys 
& Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 263-284, 2016. 
[2] Z. Lu, G. Qu, and Z. Liu. "A Survey on Recent Advances in Vehicular 
Network Security, Trust, and Privacy," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, 2018. 
[3] Y. C. Wei, and Y. M. Chen, “Efficient self-organized trust management in 
location privacy enhanced VANETs,” In International Workshop on 
Information Security Applications. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 
328-344. 
[4] C. A. Kerrache, C. T. Calafate, J. C. Cano, N. Lagraa, and P. Manzoni, 
“Trust management for vehicular networks: An adversary-oriented 
overview,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 9293-9307, 2016. 
[5] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008. 
[6] U. F. Minhas, J. Zhang, T. Tran, and R. Cohen, “A multifaceted approach 
to modeling agent trust for effective communication in the application of 
mobile ad hoc vehicular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 407-420, 2011. 
[7] F. G. Mármol, and G. M. Pérez, “TRIP, a trust and reputation 
infrastructure-based proposal for vehicular ad hoc networks,” Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 934-941, 2012. 
[8] N. Haddadou, A. Rachedi, and Y. Ghamri-Doudane, “A job market 
signaling scheme for incentive and trust management in vehicular ad hoc 
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 
3657-3674, 2015. 
[9] S. Gurung, D. Lin, A. Squicciarini, and E. Bertino, “Information-oriented 
trustworthiness evaluation in vehicular ad-hoc networks,” In International 
Conference on Network and System Security. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2013,  pp. 94-108. 
[10] Z. Huang, S. Ruj, M. A. Cavenaghi, M. Stojmenovic, and A. Nayak, “A 
social network approach to trust management in VANETs,” Peer-to-Peer 
Networking and Applications, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 229-242, 2014. 
[11] D. B. Rawat, G. Yan, B. B. Bista, and M. C. Weigle, “Trust On the 
Security of Wireless Vehicular Ad-hoc Networking,” Ad Hoc & Sensor 
Wireless Networks, vol. 24, no. 3-4, pp. 283-305, 2015. 
[12] R. Hussain, W. Nawaz, J. Lee, J. Son, and J. T. Seo, “A hybrid trust 
management framework for vehicular social networks”, In International 
Conference on Computational Social Networks. Springer, Cham, 2016, pp. 
214-225. 
[13] M. Monir, A. Abdel-Hamid, and M. A. El Aziz, “A categorized trust-based 
message reporting scheme for VANETs,” In Advances in Security of 
Information and Communication Networks. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2013, pp. 65-83. 
[14] W. Li, and H. Song, “ART: An attack-resistant trust management scheme 
for securing vehicular ad hoc networks,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 960-969, 2016. 
[15] M. Atzori, “Blockchain-based architectures for the internet of things: a 
survey,” UCL-Research Center for Blockchain Technologies, May, 2016. 
[16] B. Laurie, A. Langley, and E. Kasper, “Certificate transparency”, No. RFC 
6962, 2013. 
[17] V. Cheval, M. Ryan, and J. Yu, “DTKI: a new formalized PKI with no 
trusted parties,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.1023, 2014. 
 
Fig. 6. Time consumption of authentication. 
